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The Fifth Amendment provides, “nor shall pri-
vate property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.” Courts will generally find a
right to compensation when the government 1)
directly appropriates private property; 2) physi-
cally occupies private property; and 3) imposes
a regulatory constraint on the use of property so
severe as to deprive an owner of all economical-
ly beneficial use. 
The first and second categories might also
be called “eminent domain” or “condemna-
tion.” Eminent domain is “the inherent power
of a governmental entity to take privately owned
property, especially land, and convert it to pub-
lic use, subject to reasonable compensation for
the taking.”1 Condemnation is “to determine
and declare that certain property is assigned to
public use.”2 Inverse condemnation is “an
action brought by a property owner for compen-
sation from a governmental entity that has
taken the owner’s property without bringing
formal condemnation proceedings.”3
An example of a physical taking is the
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corporation case. In Loretto, the government
required landlords to allow installation of cable
television in their rental properties. In that
instance, the government gave itself the right to
occupy a portion of the private property without
paying for the privilege.
The third category of takings is considered a
regulatory taking. As noted above, mere regula-
tion of property is not enough for a court to find
a taking. The regulation must deprive an owner
of all economically beneficial use. For instance,
in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the
court found that a zoning ordinance prohibiting
all development on a property owner’s land
resulted in a regulatory taking.4
If the regulation merely decreases the value
of the property, it will not necessarily result in a
taking. The court will perform a multi-factor
balancing test outlined in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City5 to determine
whether or not there has been a taking. The fac-
tors include: 1) the extent to which the regula-
tion interferes with investment-backed expecta-
tions; 2) the economic impact of the regulation
on the claimant; and 3) the character of the gov-
ernment’s interest, or the social goals being pro-
moted by the government.
In this edition of The SandBar, we have
focused on various takings issues. The cases range
from more “traditional” takings cases involving
land use regulations to more novel cases, includ-
ing a case in which fishermen alleged a taking
when their fishing licenses were rendered useless
by an area being designated as a national wildlife
refuge. Please enjoy and feel free to contact us
with any questions or comments.
Endnotes
1.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 233 (2d Pocket ed.
2001). 
2.  Id. at 123-124. 
3. Id. at 124.
4.  505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
5. 438 US 104 (U.S. 1978).
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Bailey v. United States, 2007 WL 2317493 (Ct.
Fed. Cls. Aug. 10, 2007)
Sarah Spigener, 3L, University of Mississippi
School of Law
The Court of Federal Claims held that a private
property owner may seek compensation for a
regulatory taking of property at any time the
regulation continues to be enforced, even if the
regulation existed prior to the purchase of the
property or a previous owner had been awarded
compensation for the same regulatory taking.
Background
In 1989, Gary Bailey bought land bordering the
Lake of the Woods in Minnesota. Bailey initial-
ly planned to build a marina or a harbor on the
property, so he applied to the United States
Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) for a dredg-
ing permit. In 1990, the Corps approved the
permit; however, Bailey never began the pro-
ject. Three years later, the Corps informed
Bailey that he would need a different permit to
complete the project because the property was
located in a wetlands area and suggested that
Bailey hire a consultant to designate which por-
tions of his property were wetlands.
Bailey did not take any action until late
1996 when he applied to Lake of the Woods
County to have 13.2 acres of his property along
the lakeshore platted as a subdivision. As a con-
dition of approval from the county, Bailey had
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Palmyra Pac. Seafoods, L.L.C. v. United States, 80
Fed. Cl. 228 (2008).
Surya Gunasekara M.R.L.S., 1L, University of
Mississippi School of Law 
When the United States closed Palmyra Atoll to
commercial fishing, several fishing licensees
brought suit alleging a Fifth Amendment taking
claim. The Unites States Court of Federal
Claims held that there was a frustration of pur-
pose but no taking of tangible property interests
under the Fifth Amendment and subsequently
granted the United States’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 
Background
Palmyra Atoll (Palmyra) and Kingman Reef are
United States territories located approximately
1,000 nautical miles south of Hawaii. They are
“surrounded by a 200 nautical mile United
States Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that
excludes foreign fishing vessels.”1 During World
War II the United States Navy established a
base on Palmyra, which consisted of an airstrip,
dock, harbor, and base camp. The Navy held the
Kingman Reef until August 25,
2000, when it was transferred to
the Department of the Interior.
However, after World War II, the
Fullard-Leo family defeated the
United States in the Supreme
Court to establish quiet title of
Palmyra.2
The Fullard-Leo family held
title to the emergent land of
Palmyra until late 2000, when the
family sold the atoll to The
Nature Conservancy. Prior to the
sale, the Fullard-Leo family
assigned rights to Palmyra De-
velopment Co., Inc. (PDC),
which included the right to convey an exclusive
license for a commercial fishing operation on
Palmyra and use of the former base infrastruc-
ture. These license rights were then assigned by
PDC to Palmyra Pacific Enterprises, L.L.C.
(PPE). On November 17, 2000, PDC and the
Fullard-Leo family gave written consent for
PPE to assign their license rights to PPE
Limited Partnership (PPELP) and granted
PPELP permission to sublicense its rights to
Palmyra Pacific Seafoods, L.L.C. (PPS). Fol-
lowing this agreement PPS made substantial
investments on Palmyra in preparation for
developing a commercial fishing operation. 
On January 18, 2001 the tidal lands, sub-
merged lands, and waters out to 12 nautical
miles surrounding Palmyra and Kingman Reef
were designated as a National Wildlife Refuge
by order of the Secretary of the Interior. Six
days later the Department of Interior
(Interior) closed Palmyra and Kingman Reef to
commercial fishing. In 2003 and 2006, The
Nature Conservancy conveyed portions of its
holdings on Palmyra to Interior to be included
in the refuge. 
See Commercial Fishing, page 4
Court Dismisses Commercial
Fishing License Claims
Photograph of Palmyra Island courtesy of NOAA’s National Climatic Data Center.
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The plaintiffs PPS, PPE, and PPELP,
alleged that the refuge designations prohibiting
public access and commercial fishing on
Palmyra and Kingman Reef left their various
licenses, sublicenses, facility improvements,
and fishing operations worthless. As a result,
the plaintiffs argued that the government’s
action constituted a taking of valuable property
interests for public use without just compensa-
tion in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 
Motion to Dismiss Claim
The United States moved to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. The United States
argued that the plaintiffs’ licenses were not cog-
nizable property interests under the Fifth
Amendment, but mere licenses, and thus not
subject to the takings clause. The takings
clause of the Fifth Amendment protects prop-
erty interests by stating that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.3 In evaluating whether a takings
claims has been stated the court applies a two
part test. “First, the court
must determine whether
plaintiffs have estab-
lished a property inter-
est for the purposes of
the Fifth Amendment.”4
Second, after the proper-
ty interests in question
have been identified, the
court must determine if
the government action
constitutes a compensato-
ry taking. 
The plaintiffs con-
tended that they had a
property interest in the
series of contractual
licenses which granted
the exclusive, transferable
right to use Palmyra for
commercial fishing oper-
ations and these interests
were protected by the
Fifth Amendment. The United States argued
that the plaintiffs only held licenses, which are
not cognizable Fifth Amendment property inter-
ests. The court determined that this case hinged
on the issue of whether the plaintiff actually pos-
sessed a protected property interest. 
In its analysis, the court relied on Colvin
Cattle Co. v. United States, where the plaintiff
alleged that the government had taken property
interests in ranch and water rights after cancel-
ing on a long term grazing contract on an adja-
cent pasture.5 In Colvin Cattle, the federal cir-
cuit court found that despite the possible loss in
value of the ranch from losing the grazing lease,
there had not been a taking because the loss did
not occur from government restrictions on a
protected property interest. 
The court found the facts in Colvin Cattle to
be analogous with the case at bar. Here, the
plaintiffs had no property interest in the tidal
lands, submerged lands, or surrounding waters.
In fact, the Fullard-Leo family only had title to
the emergent lands of Palmyra and thus lacked
Commercial Fishing, from page 3
See Commercial Fishing, page 20
Photograph of commerical fishing boat courtesy of 
Oceansart.us/Marine Photobank at http://www.OceansArt.us and photographer John T. Everett. 
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Severance v. Patterson, 485 F. Supp. 2d 793 (S.D.
Tex. 2007).
Joseph Rosenblum, J.D. 
A federal district court in Texas recently reject-
ed a takings challenge to a rolling public beach
easement and related enforcement provisions
under the Texas Open Beaches Act (TOBA).
The court in Severance v. Patterson ruled on two
significant claims; first, a takings claim based
on the potential removal of three houses located
within a “rolling” public beach easement, and,
second, an alleged physical occupation claim
based on public access to the dry beach. The
court dismissed both claims.
Background
In early autumn of 2005, Carol Severance pur-
chased three houses on Galveston Beach, Texas.
Under the TOBA, and related underlying prin-
ciples of Texas state law, the public has a “free
and unrestricted right of ingress and egress”1 to
state-owned beaches on the Gulf of Mexico. In
cases where the state retains an easement by
virtue of continuous use by the public, the pub-
lic has a right over the dry beach extending from
the seaward boundary, marked by the mean
high tide line, to the landward boundary delin-
eated by the vegetation line. The Act further
creates a presumption that the public has
acquired such an easement over the dry beach
area, placing the burden on landowners to pre-
sent evidence to rebut this presumption. TOBA
grants the Texas Attorney General the power to
enforce the easement and specifically to
remove obstructions to the public’s right of
access from the beach, including structures
such as houses. 
Severance’s purchase contract for the three
houses included a disclosure from the seller that
the vegetation line customarily marks the land-
ward boundary of the public beach easement. It
further disclosed that structures seaward of the
vegetation line may be subject to removal. 
In the summer of 2006, the state surveyed
the vegetation line in the area of Severance’s
houses and concluded that two of them were
entirely seaward of the vegetation line and half
of the third was seaward of the vegetation line.
Consequently, according to the state, some of
Severance’s properties, including all or portions
of the houses, were on the public beach because
the vegetation line had moved. The state then
contacted Severance and informed her that the
Attorney General could seek removal of any
portion of the homes that encroached on the
public beach. 
Severance subsequently filed a federal
action to stop the state from enforcing the pub-
lic easement against her. She alleged that at the
time of purchase all three of the houses were
landward of the vegetation line; only after her
purchase did the landward boundary move
causing the houses to be located on the dry
beach. Her claim was predicated on two relat-
ed claims both arising under the U.S.
Constitution’s Fifth Amendment takings
clause. The first claim was based on possible
removal of the houses while the second was
based on the imposition of an easement allow-
ing public access to the beach area. 
The court first addressed the takings claim
relating to the threat of home removal. Noting
that no removal action had been initiated at the
time of suit, the court held that the claim was
not ripe because it was unclear as to when or if
the state would actually remove any of the hous-
es. Only if at some time in the future the state
seeks to remove Severance’s houses would she
have a ripe constitutional claim. 
The court then addressed the claim regard-
ing public access to the beach easement which it
concluded ultimately came down to whether the
See Rolling Beach Easement, page 6
Rolling Beach Easement 
Not a Taking
state of Texas could constitutionally enforce a
beach easement for public access that expands
and contracts as the vegetation line moves
through natural processes. In addressing the
merits of this question, the court noted that the
Texas judiciary has repeatedly recognized the
validity of such beach easements and has con-
sistently rejected similar constitutional claims
to those raised by Severance. Further, TOBA
does not provide an additional right, but mere-
ly identifies an enforcement mechanism for an
easement that already existed at common law. 
Accordingly, the court concluded that
Severance could not show interference with a
protected property interest. Rather, her
“allegedly-invaded interests in her rental prop-
erties are (and always have been) subject to the
public’s superior interest in its pre-existing
easement.”2 Moreover, while natural changes
might shift the boundary of the easement, “this
natural movement does not work a constitu-
tional wrong.”3
Background Principles of State Law
The court additionally made specific findings
that its decision was consistent with the
Supreme Court’s landmark takings decision,
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission, 505
U.S. 1003 (1992). In Lucas,
the Supreme Court held
that an owner suffered a
compensable taking when
the Coastal Commission
enacted a total ban on all
beach construction prevent-
ing the owner from building
on property that he pur-
chased prior to passage of
the legislation. The Court
in Lucas also recognized,
however, that no taking
occurs where government
action simply gives effect to
“background principles of
state law.”4
The Severance court ex-
plicitly recognized Texas’
rolling beach easements as a background princi-
ple of Texas state law. In Severance, unlike in
Lucas, the relevant property law was established
long before the purchase of the impacted prop-
erties. Further, a rolling beach “easement is one
of the ‘background principles’ of Texas littoral
property law.”5 Consequently, Severance could
not have suffered a takings because “her right to
exclude the public never extended seaward of
the dynamic, natural boundary of the beach.”6
Conclusion
The court ultimately dismissed the suit noting
that nothing in the federal constitution pro-
hibits applying the principles of accretion and
erosion to establishing property boundaries and
holding that Severance’s property interests were
subject to the pre-existing beach easement.
Endnotes
1.  TEX. NAT. RES. CODe § 61.011(a).
2.  Severance v. Patterson, 485 F. Supp. 2d 793,
803 (S.D. Tex 2007).
3.  Id. at 804.
4.  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
5.  Severance, 485 F. Supp. 2d at 804.
6.  Id.
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Photograph of  Texas beachfront property threatened by beach erosion provided courtesy of  Ellis Pickett,
Chairman of Texas Surfrider's Foundation.
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United States Gypsum Company v. Executive
Office of Environmental Affairs, 867 N.E.2d 764
(Mass. App. Ct. 2007).
Alicia Schaffner, 2L, Roger Williams University
School of Law
A Massachusetts appellate court has concluded
that there was no regulatory taking of property
in a designated port area (DPA) when the
Director of the Massachusetts Office of Coastal
Zone Management placed requirements on a
property owner as a condition of being excluded
from the DPA. 
Background
The Massachusetts Office of Coastal Zone
Management (OCZM) has created designated
port areas (DPA) in order to encourage proper
use of coastal resources in a manner that is con-
sistent with the federal Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act. These regulations are to promote
“water dependent indus-
trial uses” of the re-
sources.1 The theory be-
hind these regulations is
that non-industrial and
non-marine uses have a
“far greater range of lo-
cational options.”2
In 2002, five property
owners in the DPA asked
for the OCZM to con-
duct a “boundary re-
view” to decide if their
lands should remain
within the DPA. All of
these property owners
wanted to use their land
for non-water dependent
uses such as residential
condominiums. The OCZM found that one
property could be excluded from the DPA, two
should stay in the DPA, and two could be
excluded once the owners complied with certain
conditions. These conditions included an ease-
ment for a roadway that was to be built on the
properties. The Director of the OCZM accepted
the conclusions from the boundary review.
Three property owners, United States
Gypsum Company, LaFarge North America,
Inc., and Charlestown Commerce Center
(CCC), brought three separate suits, which were
later consolidated. Two of the property owners
requested the reversal of the conditional exclu-
sions from the DPA on the following grounds: 1)
the director exceeded his authority when mak-
ing this decision and 2) he did not have sub-
stantial evidence when he made his decision.
Additionally, the owner of CCC, Donato
Pizzuti, requested “a boundary review leading
See Designated Port, page 8
Court Denies Regulatory
Taking in Designated Port Area
Photograph of industrial port courtesy of NOAA.
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to exclusion of the CCC from the DPA[,]” and
challenged “the denial of an exclusion for the
CCC in the proceedings under review” as a
denial of due process and stated that the CCC’s
“continued inclusion in the DPA constituted a
regulatory taking.”3
The lower court concluded that the direc-
tor’s decision was within his power to make and
denied all of plaintiffs’ claims. All appealed.
The Court’s Decision
The Appeals Court of Massachusetts in Suffolk
disagreed with the lower courts on all claims
except those in regard to the CCC. The court
first looked at the director’s authority. The DPA
designation regulations state that a property
must be included in the DPA when it meets the
designation standards. The OCZM can only
make “minor adjustments” to a DPA boundary
and these adjustments should not have the con-
sequence of a “net reduction in the total area of
the DPA.”4 The court found that these regula-
tions clearly limit the director’s discretion in
designation. Furthermore, the purpose of the
regulations is to preserve the coast for water-
dependent industrial use to the greatest extent
possible. The director admitted that the exclu-
sion would cause a six percent reduction of the
DPA’s land area, but found this to be acceptable.
There are many regulations that limit direc-
tors’ discretionary power when it comes to DPA
designation; however, the director was able to
find a provision in the regulation that he felt
afforded him wide discretion in this matter. The
court did not find that this grant of discretion
could be so broadly read. The court said that it
“would be an extraordinary distortion of ordi-
nary meaning to transform the discretion to
condition a decision designating a property that
must be included or remain in the DPA because
it meets the designation criteria … into discre-
tion to do precisely the reverse.”5 To allow the
discretion to be utilized this way would mean
that his decisions would work contrary to the
goals of the regulations.
The court also found that there was not
substantial evidence to support the director’s
decision. The court is not required to affirm the
agency’s decision unless there is enough infor-
mation from which an ordinary person could
come to the same conclusion or if there is an
overwhelming amount of evidence that cuts
against the agency’s decision. In this instance,
there was no way for the director to show that
even if he had an easement that the road would
be built, because there was no evidence that the
road was going to be funded by anyone in the
near future. Therefore, there was nothing that
warranted the director’s decision to exclude
otherwise suitable properties from being
included in the DPA.
The court then addressed the rest of the
CCC’s claims. At this point the court agreed
with the findings of the lower court. Regarding
the inclusion of CCC in the DPA, the court
found that the CCC met the regulatory criteria
for classification as a DPA; therefore, the land
must be included in the DPA. 
The court also found that Pizzuti’s due
process claim was moot. He had claimed his due
process right was violated because he was not
allowed to negotiate for a conditioned exclusion
from the DPA regulation, however, since the
court already said that these exclusions were not
valid, the claim was moot. 
Finally, the court looked at CCC’s regulato-
ry taking claim. The court found no merit to
Pizzuti’s claim that he had been “deprived of all
‘economically viable use’ of his land by virtue of
its inclusion,” because he had failed to support
this claim with the required facts.6 It is also
worth noting that Pizzuti was never looking for
compensation for his taking, but was instead
trying to circumvent the findings of the agency
by having the court reexamine the evidence
under the guise of a constitutional claim.
The court listed several other reasons why
this is not a taking. The first is that DPA regu-
lations allow twenty-five percent of the proper-
ty to be used for non-water dependent and non-
industrial purposes provided that these purpos-
es are not incompatible with how the waterfront
functions. Furthermore, the owner could not
See Designated Port, page 15
Designated Port, from page 7
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Trepanier v. County of Volusia, 965 So. 2d 276
(Fla. 2007).
Lynda Lancaster, J.D. 
The beachside communities of Volusia County,
Florida, including Daytona Beach, are famous
for sands hard enough to drive on. In fact, at one
time, the beaches were used to set automobile
land speed records. However, after several hur-
ricanes shifted the public portion of the beach
closer to private property, the landowners ob-
jected to the county allowing beach goers to
drive and park on the beach.
Backgrounds 
Endangered sea turtle and nesting
shore birds share the beaches of
Volusia County with all the other sun
seekers. The county protects these
species by setting aside a thirty-foot
Habitat Conservation Zone (HCZ)
in which vehicles are prohibited.
Prior to Hurricanes Floyd and Irene
in 1999, the HCZ area was outside of
private property. The hurricanes
caused substantial erosion, which
resulted in the county moving the
HCZ farther landward onto private
lots. After the HCZ was moved, vehi-
cles began driving up to and parking
on the edge of the HCZ, which was
on the private lots. Hurricanes in
2004 resulted in further erosion and
encroachment onto the private prop-
erty. 
Several beachfront homeowners,
Alfred Trepanier, Louis Celenza,
and Zsuzsanna Celenza, filed suit
against Volusia County. The home-
owners alleged the county had ap-
propriated their property for parking
and driving lanes. The homeowners also alleged
trespass based on the maintenance of the park-
ing and driving lanes. Finally, the plaintiffs
filed an inverse condemnation claim based on
the county’s installation of HCZ posts on their
property. 
In response, the county alleged that the pub-
lic had a right to use the property based on the
theories of dedication, prescription, and cus-
tom. The county sought an injunction to stop
the plaintiffs’ interference with the public’s
rights of access. The county also asked the court
See Volusia, page 10
Photograph of green sea turtle courtesy of Matt Wyatt/Marine Photobank.
Landowners Prevail in 
Beach Access Case
Page 10                                                                              Regulatory Takings Issue Volume 7, No. 1 The SandBar
Volusia, from page 9
to declare that the county held a strip of beach
in front of the Celenzas’ lot in trust for the pub-
lic. The trial court denied the homeowners’
request for summary judgment on those claims
and granted summary judgment to the county. 
On appeal to the Fifth District Court of
Appeals, the plaintiffs claimed that the entry of
summary judgment was in error because it was
not clear whether the elements of dedication,
prescription, and custom had been satisfied.
Citing City of Daytona Beach v. Tony-Rama,1 the
county argued that the public has the right to
access and use the beach, including the right to
drive and park on the beach. The county also
argued that the public use right moves with the
changing coastline.
Prescription, Dedication, Custom
On appeal, the court looked at whether the ele-
ments of dedication, prescription, and custom
had been satisfied. To gain a prescriptive ease-
ment in land, the access must be continuous for
the statutory period of twenty years, actual,
adverse under a claim of right, and either
known to the owner or so open, notorious, and
visible that knowledge may be imputed to the
owner.2 Additionally, the access must be incon-
sistent with the rights of the landowner, other-
wise it would be presumed that the use was by
the permission of the landowner. Finally, the
occupation must be a defined area with a defi-
nite end. The court determined that it was not
clear from the record whether the public was
continuously driving on the area of the beach at
issue or that the public’s use was adverse; there-
fore, there were genuine issues that precluded
the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. 
Dedication is another way that the public
could obtain a right to use private property. To
show that there has been a dedication, the
landowner must have expressed a present inten-
tion to appropriate his lands to public use. In this
case, the beachfront homeowners argued that
there was no clear indication that that was ever
done on their beachfront. While the trial court
found that the developers had established roads,
streets, and drives for public use, the appellate
court determined that the developers’  maps and
descriptions did not indicate a dedication, and
thus there was no right of access by dedication. If
people were accessing the beach, it was without
the homeowners’ permission.
Custom is the third way to gain public
beach access. Custom is a practice that has the
force of law due to a common adoption of a
long-unvarying habit.3
First, the court noted that the Florida
Supreme Court’s decision in Tona-Rama held
that the public may acquire a right to use the
sandy area adjacent to the mean high tide line
by custom when the use of the sandy area has
been ancient, reasonable, without interruption
and free from dispute. The appellate court held
that the intent of the court in Tona-Rama was to
establish a public-use right only for the beach in
question in that case. 
Next, the court looked at how a
customary right is established. The
court agreed with the plaintiffs that
the elements of whether the use was
ancient, reasonable, without inter-
ruption and free from dispute
required a fact specific examination,
which the trial court did not perform
before granting summary judgment.
Furthermore, the court found that
although driving and parking were a
customary use of some of the beaches,
this did not include all of Volusia
See Volusia, page 17
Photograph of of Ralph DePalma driving in the sand in his Packard '905' Special in 1919, 
courtesy of Florida Photographic Collection, State Archives of Florida.
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Regulatory Taking, from page 2
to construct an access road as an extension of an
existing road to the property. In June 1998,
Bailey was orally advised to cease work on the
access road until he obtained the necessary per-
mit from the Corps.
Bailey applied for an after-the-fact permit
for the access road. With his application to the
county, Bailey submitted a Wetland Replace-
ment Plan pursuant to the Minnesota Wetland
Conservation Act. The county forwarded the
application to the Corps and the Corps
acknowledged that a wetlands permit was need-
ed pursuant to the Clean Water Act. In Sep-
tember, the Corps sent Bailey a written order to
stop operations until a permit was obtained;
however, Bailey continued to work on the road
to obtain county approval. In December, the
county approved the fourteen lot subdivision
and in August 1999 the county approved the
access road.
In August 2000, the Corps conducted its own
wetlands delineation of the property and deter-
mined that a majority of the land was wetlands.
In October, the Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency revoked its previously-issued water
quality certification and in June 2001, the Corps
denied the after-the-fact permit for the access
road. The Corps gave Bailey three options: (1)
completely remove the road; (2) partially
remove the road; or (3) mitigate. In October
2001, the Corps ordered the road to be com-
pletely removed.
By this time, some of the lots had been sold.
When the permit was denied, Bailey bought
back four of the lots. In August 2002, Bailey
sued the Corps alleging that the restrictions on
the subdivision property deprived him of all
economically beneficial and productive use of
his land, or, in the alternative, substantially
diminished the value of his property, resulting
in a regulatory taking of his property requiring
just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.
Regulatory Taking
In order to bring a claim, the claim must be
based on a final agency decision. Initially, the
Corps argued that the court should dismiss the
taking claim for lack of ripeness or readiness,
because there was no final decision. The court
found that the taking claim based on the
restoration order was ripe, agreeing with
Bailey’s argument that the order to remove the
road was a final decision because it prohibited
access to the property. Furthermore, the court
held that Bailey’s challenge of the restoration
order did not bar him from proceeding with the
taking claim. 
The crux of the decision focused on what
property was allegedly taken by the Corps’
denial of the permit. The Corps argued that
Bailey could only base his taking claim on the
property interests he held on the date of the
alleged taking, and not on the interests he
acquired after that date, such as the lots he
bought back. The court explained that govern-
ment compensation for the physical displace-
ment of a private property owner from the exer-
cise of a property interest is permanent. For
example, if the takings claim was based on a
physical invasion of private property by the gov-
ernment, a subsequent owner could not seek
government compensation.
However, the court found that no court had
previously considered a regulatory taking claim
raised by a subsequent owner. The court relied
on the Supreme Court’s decision in First
English,1 which emphasized that a government
actor whose regulatory actions are found to have
taken property cannot be required to obtain the
full, permanent interests in the property;
because, the government retains the option of
converting the taking into a temporary one.
The court also relied upon the Supreme
Court’s decision in Palazzolo,2 in which the
court held that a property owner may base a tak-
ings claim on the application of a regulation to
his property even if the regulation existed prior
to his ownership. The Supreme Court stated
that the “claim is not barred by the mere fact
that title was acquired after the effective date of
the state-imposed restriction.”3 The court
explained that when a government restriction
on the use of the property is so severe as to
See Regulatory Taking, page 19
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Cowlitz County v. Martin, 2008 Wash. App.
LEXIS 224 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2008). 
Sara Wilkinson, 3L, University of Mississippi
School of Law 
The Washington Court of Appeals has held that
the Salmon Recovery Act does not afford coun-
ties, cities, and tribal governments the authori-
ty to condemn private property. In its holding,
the court contemplated three primary ques-
tions: 1) whether the Salmon Recovery Act
authorizes the state or its entities to condemn
private property; 2) whether rehabilitation of
salmon streams constitutes a public use, a pre-
requisite for condemnation of private property
under state law; and 3) whether a county’s
deputy prosecuting attorney has the authority
to articulate an additional purpose for condem-
nation of private property  not considered by the
Board of Commissioners.
Background
In 2002, Cowlitz County, Washington, applied
for and received a $447,000 grant from the
Salmon Recovery Fund to replace a culvert that
it claimed posed an impediment to fish passage.
At the time the county received the grant, it
held an easement on the property for the culvert
in its current state. However, the proposed cul-
vert, funded by the grant from the Salmon
Recovery Fund, would require an expanded
easement over the private property. 
In April 2005, the county began negotiations
with the property owners to enlarge the existing
easement through voluntary purchase and sale.
However, the parties never came to an agree-
ment and in October 2005 the Cowlitz County
Board of Commissioners passed a resolution
authorizing the county prosecuting attorney to
bring a condemnation action against the prop-
erty owners to acquire the enlarged easement. 
The Board of Commissioners’ resolution,
and subsequently the petition for condemna-
tion filed on behalf of the county, stated that
the project was necessary to remove and
replace an existing culvert that posed a barri-
er to fish passage and was to be funded from
the grant awarded to the county by the Salmon
Recovery Funding Board. In addition, the res-
olution and petition stated that the additional
property was required to complete the cul-
vert replacement project, which constituted a
public use as required for condemnation of
private property under state law. However,
upon filing the petition for condemnation, the
county’s chief civil deputy prosecuting attor-
ney alleged an additional reason for condem-
nation that was not contemplated in the Board
of Commissioners’ resolution. The petition
stated that the existing culvert, in addition to
posing a barrier to fish passage, was not ade-
quate to handle storm stream flows under a
100-year storm and the petition was necessary
to prevent road damage. The Cowlitz
County Superior Court ruled in favor of the
county, and the property owner appealed.
Salmon Recovery Act
The Salmon Recovery Act was enacted by the
Washington State Legislature in 1999 in an
effort to improve salmonid fish runs through-
out the state. The Act encourages the state to
integrate local and regional recovery activities
primarily by providing state funds to coun-
ties, cities, and tribal governments to repair
and improve fish runs that are designated on
a “habitat project list.” While any project may
be placed on the habitat project list, the Act
specifically states, “no project included on a
habitat project list shall be considered
mandatory in nature and no private landown-
er may be forced or coerced into participation
in any respect.”1
Court Rejects Condemnation of Private
Property under Salmon Recovery Act
Per the express language of the Salmon
Recovery Act, the court found nothing in the act
granting a county, city, or tribal government the
authority to condemn private property. The
court stated that the Legislature did not intend
to grant any eminent domain authority through
its passage of the Salmon Recovery Act and thus
counties, cities, and tribal governments had no
authority to condemn private property under
the auspices of the Act. 
Public Use Requirement
Washington state law confers the power of emi-
nent domain to counties when the condemna-
tion is necessary for a public use. Procedurally,
a petition for condemnation must be filed with
the county superior court followed by a trial
court hearing after which the court must issue
an order granting or denying the petition. In
determining public use and necessity, the trial
court must consider whether: 1) the use in ques-
tion is really a public use; 2) the public interest
requires the public use; and 3) the property to
be acquired is necessary to facilitate the public
use. In this case, the trial court granted the peti-
tion for condemnation of the private property
finding that fish passage is a public use. 
A review of the resolution passed by the
Cowlitz County Board of Commissioners
revealed that the board chose to proceed with the
culvert replacement strictly under the Salmon
Recovery Act and did not articulate any other
specific public purpose. The
Washington Court of Appeals
pointed to the clear language in the
Salmon Recovery Act specifically
prohibiting counties from con-
demning private property for pro-
jects solely funded and regulated
by the Act. In this case, the Cowlitz
County Board of Commissioners
authorized the condemnation of
the private property solely for the
purpose of improving fish passage
by means of a project funded by
and under the auspices of the
Salmon Recovery Act. 
The court reversed the trial court’s grant for
condemnation relying on the specific language
of the Salmon Recovery Act. However, the court
pointed out that condemnation could potential-
ly be granted for the project if another public
use was determined or even still using the fish
passage as a public use so long as the Board of
Commissioners did not authorize condemna-
tion under the Salmon Recovery Act. 
Prosecuting Attorney’s Authority 
According to Washington state law, a county must
determine the necessity of condemnation through
the authority of its Board of Commissioners.
Here, the Cowlitz County Board of Com-
missioners, in their resolution, deemed the repair
of a fish passage a necessity but did not speak to
any other factors in their decision to condemn the
property. The court found that because the cul-
vert’s current ability to handle storm stream flows
was not contemplated or addressed by the Board
of Commissioners, the county’s deputy prosecut-
ing attorney had no authority to determine the
necessity for a condemnation and acted without
authority by articulating an additional purpose
for replacing the culvert.
Conclusion
The Washington Court of Appeals held that the
Recovery Act contains express language remov-
ing a county’s authority to exercise its powers of
Photograph of spawning salmon courtesy of Marine Photobank and photographer Reuven Walder.
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Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 76 Fed.
Cl. 100 (2007). 
Terra Bowling, J.D. 
The U.S. Court of Federal Claims ruled that a
taking claim regarding a regulatory restriction
on water use is subject to the Penn Central tak-
ing analysis, and not the per se physical occupa-
tion taking theory. 
Background
The Casitas Municipal Water District operates
a water project on behalf of the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation (BOR) that supplies water to
Ventura County, California, for irrigation and
other uses. The district’s use of the water is
subject to a license from the State Water
Control Board.
In 1997, the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS) listed the West Coast steelhead
trout as an endangered species. Because the
trout are in the Ventura River, Casitas and the
BOR worked with NMFS to determine how the
habitat could be preserved and improved.
NMFS eventually issued a Biological Opinion
that included revised project operating criteria,
which resulted in a decrease in the amount of
water Casitas was allowed to divert. Although
Casitas implemented the criteria, the district
sued the United States. The district claimed
contract damages, as well as a Fifth Amendment
taking. The court rejected the contract damages
claim, and the United States sought summary
judgment on the taking claim. 
Tulare
The Fifth Amendment provides, “nor shall pri-
vate property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.” The court noted that there
is an unconditional right to compensation when
the government 1) directly appropriates private
property; 2) physically occupies private proper-
ty; and 3) imposes a regulatory constraint on the
use of property so severe as to deprive an owner
of all economically beneficial use. Aside from
these categories of per se takings, a court must
use a multi-factor balancing test outlined in
Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York City.1 The factors
include: 1) the extent to which
the regulation interferes with
investment-backed expectations;
2) the economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant; and
3) the character of the govern-
ment’s interest. 
In a recent case, Tulare Lake
Basin Water Storage District v.
United States,2 the court of feder-
al claims ruled that a regulatory
restriction on the use of water
should be treated as a per se phys-
ical taking. In the Casitas case,
the United States argued that
Tulare was decided incorrectly,
Restriction on Water Use
Not a Per Se Taking
Photograph of steelhead trout courtesy of U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.
Volume 7, No. 1  The SandBar                                          Regulatory Takings Issue Page 15
because the court focused on the finality of the
plaintiffs’ loss, instead of the character of the
government’s action. The United States also
argued that in a taking action that involves reg-
ulatory restrictions on the use of property, the
court should use the Penn Central analysis.
Relying on another Supreme Court case, Tahoe-
Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency,3 the United States argued that
a per se taking should be recognized only when
the government has physically invaded proper-
ty or appropriated property for its own or anoth-
er’s use. In Tahoe-Sierra, the court stated, “This
longstanding distinction between acquisitions
of property for public use, on the one hand, and
regulations prohibiting private uses, on the
other, makes it inappropriate to treat cases
involving physical takings as controlling prece-
dents for the evaluation of a claim that there has
been a ‘regulatory taking,’ and vice versa.”4
The court agreed that Tahoe-Sierra was
instructive. The court recognized that the gov-
ernment’s action in this case resulted in the
diminishment of the district’s right of use,
which is “… the functional equivalent of a phys-
ical taking,”5 However, the court found that
Tahoe-Sierra “compels us to respect the distinc-
tion between a government takeover of property
(either by physical invasion or by directing the
property’s use to its own needs) and govern-
ment restraints on an owner’s use of that prop-
erty.”6 The court granted the United States’
motion for partial summary judgment.
Endnotes
1.  438 U.S. 104 (U.S. 1978).
2.  49 Fed. Cl. 313 ( 2001).
3.  535 U.S. 302 (U.S. 2002). 
4.  Id. at 323-25. 
5.  Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 76
Fed. Cl. 100, 105 (2007).
6.  Id. at 106.
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establish a “categorical taking” based on the
deprivation of all economically viable use. Even
if there was a diminution in market value of the
CCC, it was not serious enough to warrant com-
pensation for a taking. The court did not agree
with the plaintiff that there was a taking based
on Penn Central, a case that outlines factors to
determine if regulation has gone “too far” and
become an unconstitutional taking. The CCC’s
claim does not satisfy any of the guiding factors
used in Penn Central. These factors include: “the
economic impact of the regulation; the extent to
which it has interfered with the owner’s ‘dis-
tinct investment-backed expectations’; and the
character of the government actions.”7 For
example, the owner had no investment-backed
expectation because the DPA regulation was in
effect when he bought the property. Lastly, the
court mentions that there was no “physical inva-
sion” of the property; therefore, the government
action involved here does not have the character
which would seem to indicate a taking. With all
of these considerations, the court found it prop-
er to deny the petitioner’s takings claim.
Conclusion
The court concluded that there was no taking in
this case and that all of the areas that met the
requirements for DPAs must be classified as
such. This is a decision that is consistent with
the regulation and promotes the goals which the
OCZM was meant to promulgate.
Endnotes
1.  United States Gypsum Company v. Executive
Office of Environmental Affairs, 867 N.E.2d
764, 767 (Mass.App.Ct. June 4, 2007).
2.  Id.
3.  Id. at 768.
4.  Id. at 771 quoting 301 MASS. CODE REGS. §
25.05(2) (1994).
5.  Id. at  772.
6.  Id. at 776-77.
7.  Id. at 777-78.
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Smiley v. South Carolina Dept. of Health and
Environmental Control, 2007 S.C. LEXIS 292
(S.C. July 30, 2007). 
Margaret Enfinger, 2L, University of Alabama
School of Law
The Supreme Court of South Carolina unani-
mously found that a permit to remove sand from
a public beach is an imminent injury, and held
that a recreational user of a public beach had
standing to contest the sand removal permit.
Background
James Smiley enjoys using a public beach in
South Carolina for recreational purposes. He is
partially disabled in both legs and uses the flat
hard public beach for rehabilitation and jogging,
as well as nature-watching. He contested a state
agency decision that gave a private company,
Wild Dunes, the right to remove sand from this
beach. The “beach sand scraping” permit allows
the company to take 25,000 cubic yards of sand
each month from November through April for
five years. Smiley alleged that the entrance of
heavy equipment onto the public beach and the
excavation would make it impossible to jog in the
area and reduce his enjoyment of the beach.
After Smiley contested the agency’s decision, the
administrative law judge, the appellate panel,
and the circuit and appellate courts found that he
did not have standing, which is the right to pur-
sue a claim in court, to challenge the permit. 
Standing
Citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,2 South
Carolina Supreme Court noted that standing
requires three elements: 1) the plaintiff must
have suffered an “injury in fact” which is con-
crete and particularized, meaning that the
plaintiff is affected in a personal and individu-
alized way, and actual or imminent, meaning
that the injury cannot be conjectural or hypo-
thetical 2) there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained
of, and 3) it must be likely that the injury will be
“redressed by a favorable decision.”2 In 2005,
the South Carolina Court of Appeals found that
Smiley did not have standing because he had
not met the first requirement of the standing
test in Lujan. The court focused on the fact that
though the permit had been issued, no sand had
been yet excavated, so there was no actual
injury. Additionally, the appellate court found
that Smiley would not suffer an “injury in fact”
even if sand were to be excavated, due to the
permit’s temporary nature. Smiley’s jogging
route would simply have a temporary detour.
The court found that sand excavation does not
substantially impair the public interest, and it is
within the state’s policy of preserving and
restoring its beaches.
The South Carolina Supreme Court dis-
agreed, finding that Smiley met the first stand-
ing requirement. The court first noted that the
injury may be actual or imminent.3 There is no
reason to wait until the injury is actually inflict-
ed. Here, the gravity of a permit to excavate so
much sand is an imminent injury. In fact, the
court notes that up to ten acres of beach per
month would be affected if the maximum
amount of sand were extracted.
Next, the court examined the appellate
court’s determination that the temporary nature
of the permit would not result in an “injury in
fact” to Smiley. The court noted that there is no
legal distinction for temporary and permanent
injuries; temporary or minor ones are still
allowed to be vindicated and allow someone a
direct stake in the outcome. Furthermore, the
agency had not submitted any evidence that the
injury from the winter excavation will be only
temporary. An interference with Smiley’s enjoy-
ment of the beach and his inability to use it for
at least those six months gives Smiley a direct
stake in the permitting decision. 
Permit to Remove Sand Is an
Imminent Injury to Beachgoers
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County beaches and should be decided on a case
by case basis. 
Finally, the court had to decide whether the
public’s use shifted with the changing shoreline.
Erosion is a fact of coastal living, which the
Florida Constitution and common law rules
acknowledge. The Florida courts have deter-
mined that the slow seaward shift of sand, caus-
es the mean high tide line to shift, resulting in a
loss of land to the landowner. The court agreed
with the county’s argument that if the change in
the mean high water mark was the result of ero-
sion, then the public’s right of access would be
preserved under the public trust doctrine. In
this case, however, it appeared as if the change
in the beach was the result of avulsion rather
than erosion. Avulsion is the sudden removal of
land through a storm or some other event.  The
court found that when the land is avulsed, or so
changed that there is a difference in the land-
scape after one storm event, the boundaries are
not subject to change, and private landowners
would not lose their beach.4 It was not certain
whether the areas subject to the public right by
custom would move as a result of avulsion. The
court reversed the summary judgment in favor
of the county and sent the question back to the
trial court to determine if the public’s right to
access the beach migrates with avulsion as it
does with erosion.
Conclusion 
The court reversed the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment, finding that the general
issues of material fact had not been resolved.
The appellate court did agree with the trial
court that if the public has a right to access the
beach by custom, there is no taking and the land
owners are not entitled to money for the public’s
access of the beach.
Endnotes
1.  294 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 1997).
2.  Trepanier v. County of Volusia, 965 So. 2d 276,
284 (Fla. 2007).
3.  Black’s Law Dictionary 169 (2d Pocket ed.
2001)
4.  In re City of Buffalo, 99 N.E. 850, 852 (NY
1912).
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Conclusion
Giving Smiley standing to
appear in court, the South
Carolina Supreme Court
directed the administra-
tive law judge to proceed
with the case and allow
Smiley a chance to contest
the agency’s permit.
Endnotes
1. Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560-561 (1992).
2. Smiley v. S.C. Dep’t of
Health & Envtl. Control,
374 S.C. 326, 329 (S.C.
2007).
3.  Lujan, 560-561. Photograph of public beach courtesy of ©Nova Development Corp.
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Banks v. United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 603 (Ct. Cl.
2007). 
Terra Bowling, J.D. 
In a takings case arising from coastal erosion on
Lake Michigan caused by an Army Corps of
Engineers project, the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims has ruled that the government is respon-
sible for 30 percent of each plaintiff ’s property
loss above the mean high water mark.
Background
Between 1950 and 1989, the Corps performed
construction and maintenance on harbor jet-
ties around the mouth of St. Joseph River to
accommodate commercial shipping. After the
lakeshore south of the jetties began to erode,
the Corps began a beach renourishment pro-
gram in the 1970s; however, the project proved
ineffective.
In 1999, property owners affected by the ero-
sion filed suit against the United States, alleg-
ing that the Corps’ activities caused erosion of
their shoreline property and resulted in a taking
under the Fifth Amendment. After the trial on
liability in June 2007, the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims had to consider whether the govern-
ment’s renourishment efforts compensated for
the effects of the jetties enough to show that the
erosion was not attributable to the government. 
Liability
The court first looked at whether the jetties
affected plaintiffs’ properties. The court found
that the plaintiffs’ properties were affected by
the jetties, citing a 1958 study as well as Corps
reports attributing 30 percent of the total ero-
sion to the jetties. 
To determine whether the renourishment
project was effective, the court looked at the
adequacy of nourishment material used by the
Corps, the sediment transport rate, and the
effective placement of nourishment material.
The court first found that the plaintiffs failed to
prove that their properties were located on a
cohesive lake bottom, meaning that the proper-
ty damage would not be analyzed as permanent
and irreversible. Next, the court found that the
sediment used by the Corps in the renourish-
ment process was the inappropriate size and
was ineffective. Therefore, that portion of the
renourishment program was not credited as
mitigation to the Corps. The court next looked
at the sediment transport rate, including the net
littoral drift and the various factors affecting
the net southerly littoral drift, to determine how
much sediment was affected by the jetties.
Finally, in looking at the effective placement of
the nourishment material, the court found “by a
preponderance of credible evidence” most of the
nourishment was placed in a way that would
replenish the plaintiffs’ property.
The court considered additional arguments
regarding the Corps’ liability. The plaintiffs
argued that revetments constructed by the
Michigan Department of Transportation and
Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company to stop
erosion resulted in further erosion to their prop-
erty and was attributable to the Corps’ restora-
tion project. The court found that the plaintiffs
failed to prove that the Corps caused direct
injury to the plaintiffs through the building of
the revetments.  Although the plaintiffs also
argued that the impermeable nature of the jet-
ties contributed to erosion, the court found that
the property owners failed to prove that the jet-
ties were impermeable. Finally, the plaintiffs
argued that although Lake Michigan is lower-
ing, the plaintiffs would still suffer erosion
because the lakebed was lowering due to sand
deprivation. The court noted that owners failed
to prove that the lowering of the water level was
due to human intervention. 
Corps Liable for Shoreline
Erosion on Lake Michigan
Holdings
Through exhaustive testimony and reports, the
court found that the Corps did not mitigate ero-
sion that it caused by dumping dredged sand
into deep water before 1970. The court conclud-
ed that the Corps was responsible for 30 percent
of the unmitigated erosion above the high water
mark occurring after each owner’s acquisition
of the property from 1950 to 1970. The court
then turned to liability for erosion caused after
1970.
While the court found that the court had
mitigated erosion since 1970, it also found that
the coarse material it used was not effective for
mitigation. Therefore, the court was liable for
damages of for any portion of 30 percent of each
plaintiff ’s total erosion above the high water
mark since 1970 and after each owner’s acquisi-
tion of the property. Additionally, the Corps is
liable for 30 percent of all reasonably foreseeable
future loss. Finally, the court held that the Corps
was liable to plaintiffs with property at the
northernmost end of the plaintiffs’ zone.
Because the property in this area was found to be
permanent and irreversible, the Corps was liable
for 30 percent of total erosion above the ordinary
high water mark that occurred after plaintiff ’s
acquisition of the property after 1950, as well as
any reasonably foreseeable future loss. 
Conclusion
The case will next move to the damages phase,
in which the government will determine the
appropriate payments for each plaintiff.
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result in a taking, the owner is suing for his loss
of use, not for the loss of subsequent owners.4
The court further explained that a regulato-
ry taking can never be viewed as a permanent
restriction on the land since the government
may choose to stop regulating the use of the
property at any time. As a result, the court held
that whoever owns the property while the regu-
latory taking continues is entitled to compensa-
tion. The court reasoned that the right to use
property runs with the land. If a current owner
is compensated for the restricted use of his land,
a subsequent owner of the restricted land would
be similarly entitled to compensation. Con-
sequently, the court held that Bailey could seek
compensation for the alleged taking of his prop-
erty interests in five lots, one which he continu-
ously owned and four that he had repurchased
after the permit denial.
Conclusion
A property owner who owned lakeshore proper-
ty which he converted to subdivision lots
brought this action to contest the denial of an
after-the-fact permit and order of the Corps,
pursuant to wetlands regulation, to remove an
access road he had constructed for his property
amidst Corps warnings to cease construction
operations. The plaintiff argued that the regula-
tion of his property, which left the property
without a means of access, rendered it void of
any economic value. The Corps argued that the
plaintiff could not assert a taking claim based
on his property interests in the reacquired lots
because a taking claim should be based on prop-
erty interests at the time of the alleged taking.
However, the court held that rule was only
applicable to physical permanent takings. The
court held that current owners, as well as subse-
quent owners, may assert a regulatory taking
claim and seek compensation. Therefore Bailey
could assert a regulatory taking claim for four
lots which he repurchased and one lot for which
he continuously held title.
Endnotes
1.  First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304 (1987).
2.  Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606
(2001).
3.  Id. at 630.
4. Bailey v. United States, 2007 WL 2317493
(Ct. Fed. Cls. Aug. 10, 2007). (Emphasis in
the opinion).
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the ability to grant a license to the plaintiffs for
any of tidal lands, submerged lands, or sur-
rounding waters. Furthermore, the plaintiffs
freely admitted that the government restrictions
regarding the refuge only applied to the tidal
lands, submerged lands, and surrounding
waters to which the plaintiffs had no claim.
Thus, the plaintiffs had not lost value in their
licenses by virtue of the government restriction
on commercial fishing surrounding their prop-
erty interest. Since there had been no restric-
tions regarding the emergent land, the govern-
ment had not imposed any restrictions on the
plaintiffs protected property rights. 
What had occurred was a frustration of
purpose of the commercial fishing licenses, as
opposed to a Fifth Amendment taking. The
court examined the Supreme Court case Omnia
Commercial Co. v. United States, which held
that the plaintiffs had suffered a frustration of
purpose, but not a taking.6 In Omnia, the plain-
tiff had a large, long-term contract with a steel
company at a low fixed price. The government
requisitioned all the steel from that company
throughout 1918 in order to supply the
demands for World War I and ordered the com-
pany not to fulfill any of its contractual oblig-
ations.7 The Supreme Court ruled that the loss
of the contract was merely consequential and
the Fifth Amendment takings clause did not
provide a remedy. The Court subsequently
denied the plaintiff ’s takings clause claim
holding that frustration of purpose and appro-
priation for public use are completely differ-
ent. Applying Omnia, the court found that the
purpose of the plaintiffs’ commercial fishing
licenses had been frustrated by the closure of
the surrounding waters to commercial fishing.
However, the governmental action did not
appropriate the rights which those licenses
granted. Therefore, the court found that the
government could not be liable under the
plaintiffs takings claim. 
The plaintiffs relied on Cienega Gardens v.
United States in an attempt to refute the claim
that the government’s actions represented a
frustration of purpose rather than a constitu-
tional taking. In Cienega Gardens the Federal
Circuit Court abandoned the principles set
forth in Omnia, because the government action
specifically targeted the plaintiff ’s contractual
rights.8 In the present case, the plaintiffs intro-
duced several documents which they claimed
demonstrated that the government action in
creating the refuge was intended to nullify their
licenses. The court rejected this argument stat-
ing that while in Cienega Gardens the govern-
mental actions directly affected the contracts,
in Omnia and this case the actions only regulat-
ed the subject matter of the contracts, steel, and
commercial fishing operations respectively. 
Conclusion
The United States Court of Federal Claims
granted the United States’ motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim holding that the designa-
tion and closure of the Palmyra refuge frustrat-
ed the purpose of the plaintiffs’ licenses but did
not violate the takings clause of the Fifth
Amendment because the plaintiff was unable to
assert a protected cognizable property interest.
Furthermore, the court concluded that even if
the plaintiffs’ licenses constituted a protected
property interest, the plaintiffs were unable to
“allege that the government’s designation of the
Palmyra National Wildlife Refuge and closure
of the refuge to commercial fishing directly reg-
ulated operations under those licenses.”9
Endnotes
1.  Palmyra Pac. Seafoods, L.L.C. v. U.S., 80 Fed.
Cl. 228 (2008).
2.  U.S. v. Fullard-Leo, 331 U.S. 256 (1947). 
3.  U.S. Const amend. V.
4.  Palmyra, 80 Fed. Cl. at 230 (citing Colvin
Cattle Co. v. U.S., 468 F.3d 803, 806 (Fed. Cir.
2006)).
5.  Colvin Cattle Co., 468 F.3d at 808. 
6.  Omnia Commercial Co. v. U.S., 261 U.S. 502
(1923).
7.  Id. 
8.  Cienega Gardens v. U.S., 503 F.3d 1266 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
9.  Palmyra, 80 Fed. Cl. at 236.
Commerical Fishing, from page 4
Volume 7, No. 1  The SandBar                                          Regulatory Takings Issue Page 21
By Will Wilkins
In prior articles in this series, we discussed
copyrights in general as well as the more specif-
ic issue of when and how you can use someone
else’s copyrighted work. In this article, I will
continue to look a bit more specifically at copy-
right protection and how you can protect your
own creative works.
In other words, what do you need to do to
protect a book, article, website, etc. you have
created? As I discussed in the last article, there
are certainly times when other folks can use
your work without your permission but there
are also times when use by another would con-
stitute copyright infringement and we’re going
to discuss ways of protecting against the latter
(infringing uses) in this article. 
Let’s take a brief step back here at the outset
and review what exactly can be copyrighted.
Copyright protection exits in this country for
original works of authorship which have been placed
in tangible form for a limited period of time. The
first requirement, thus, is
that the work must be
original – that is, it must
be the work of the creator
(not your neighbor) and it
must be, at least in a
basic sense, creative.
Second, the work must be
one of the types of works
decreed in the copyright
statutes to fall under the
protection of copyright
which includes such
things as: books, articles,
plays, music, and artwork.
Finally, the work must be
in tangible form which
means somewhere other than rattling around in
the creator’s head. As long as the work is on
paper, computer, or any other type of recoding
media it easily meets this requirement.
What else is required technically to create a
copyrighted work? Nothing at all. Short article,
right? Basic protection is, in fact, that simple. If
a work is an original “work” and in tangible
form, it is protected by federal copyright law.
However, the story does not necessarily end
there. There are several additional steps you as
the creator can take to protect your works.
One method of enhancing copyright protec-
tion is by registering the work with the Library
of Congress. Registration is relatively inexpen-
sive and simple. It involves filing in a form and
mailing the form, a check with the filing fee,
and a sample of the work to the Library of
Congress. Registration is required before copy-
right enforcement in federal court and, once a
case is in court, provides several legal advan-
tages including shifting the burden of proof and
Protecting Your
Copyrighted Works© ®
Photograph of west front of the Library of Congress courtesy of The Library of Congress Historic American 
Engineering Record.
See Copyright, page 22
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the availability of additional damages. So, regis-
tration can be a valuable step in protecting your
copyright.
An even simpler method of protection is to
use a copyright notice. The copyright notice
was once required on works claiming protec-
tion but this is no longer the case. Use of the
notice on works, however, has a tremendous
deterrent effect. People see the notice and think
“well, that work is protected, I’ll look elsewhere
for materials for my website.” The form of the
notice can be one of the following: [©your
name, date] or [copyright, your name, date].
For example, on this article I could mark it “©
Will Wilkins, 2008.” Notice is a great and
cheap way of protecting copyrighted works.
Another deterrent-type protection is simply
being careful with what you do with your works
and how you use them, especially works used
on the internet. If you do not want your work
copied from your website, protect the work as
best you can. With photos, use a low-resolution
image that looks good on the website but does
not print well. Watermarks may also be helpful.
For textual works, PDFs may provide protec-
tion over more easily editable formats. 
Of course, there are times when nothing
you can do will deter a determined copyright
infringer. So, what should a copyright owner do
when his work has been used without permis-
sion or legal justification (fair use, etc.)?
The answer, of course, is check with his
attorney. Strategies often employed include
demand letters and lawsuits. If the infringe-
ment is online, a simple approach is to notify
the infringer’s website hosting site asking them
to shut down the infringing website. This proce-
dure, created under the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, is outlined on the Library of
Congress’ copyright website.
The good news is that simple measures such
as registration and the use of copyright notice
generally deter most infringement. These steps
are inexpensive and effective.
In the next issue, we will turn toward the
seemingly simple question of: who owns that
copyright? Stay tuned.
eminent domain under the auspices of the Act.
The court also found that the restoration or
improvement of salmonid fish runs did not con-
stitute a public use as articulated by state
law and prior jurisprudence. Finally, the court
held that the county’s deputy prosecuting attor-
ney acted outside the scope of his authority by
alleging an additional purpose for replacing the
culvert in the petition for condemnation that
was not contemplated by the Cowlitz County
Board of Commissioners.
Endnotes
1.  WASH. REV. CODE § 77.85.050(1)(a).
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How to Protect
Your Copyright
A checklist . . .
We learned that to receive copyright pro-
tection a work merely needs to be a pro-
tected type of work, original, and in tangi-
ble form. To provide additional protection,
take these steps: 
• Register your work with the Library of
Congress.
• Use a copyright notice.
• Use care when publishing your works-
don’t make it easy on copyright
infringers!
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The world’s largest marine reserve has been established by the Pacific Island nation of Kiribati.
The area covers 410,500 square kilometers and includes 120 species of coral reefs and over 500
species of fish, as well as sea bird nesting sites. The
island nation, which is located halfway between Fiji
and Hawaii, received a boat donated by Australia to
patrol the area. 
Citing an 1818 survey, the Georgia state legislature
passed a resolution to restore the boundary line
between Georgia and Tennessee to the 35th parallel.
The current border runs below the Tennessee River
and a shift would give Georgia a portion of the river.
The resolution was passed in the wake of recent water
rights issues in Georgia. If the Tennessee state govern-
ment does not approve the change, Georgia could take
its case to the United States Supreme Court. 
An Australian fisherman swam nine miles from his capsized boat to shore. After the fisherman was
discovered, authorities were dispatched to find two other crewmembers. A helicopter was able to
rescue one crewmember, who had been clinging to an ice cooler to remain afloat. The third crew-
man had separated from the ice cooler in the middle of the night and there was no sign of him. 
A Navy airlift saved the day for a 14-year old girl whose appendix ruptured while she was aboard
a cruise with her family. When the cruise ship sent out a distress call, the USS Ronald Reagan sent
a helicopter to airlift the teenager
back to its ship, which had the near-
est hospital facility. 
In Hawaii, neighbors are feuding over
whether short-term rentals should be
allowed in residential areas. Some
residents are fed up with the noise
tourists bring to their neighborhoods
and worry that the practice destroys
the sense of community. Local law-
makers are considering proposals to
eliminate permits that allow short-
term vacation rentals in residential
areas, the AP says.
Photograph of  starfish on coral formation courtesy of ©Nova
Development Corps.
Photograph of  Hawaii residential area courtesy of ©Nova Development Corps.
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